Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon by Anthoff, D. et al.
Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon
This article has been downloaded from IOPscience. Please scroll down to see the full text article.
2009 Environ. Res. Lett. 4 024002
(http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/4/2/024002)
Download details:
IP Address: 130.37.129.78
The article was downloaded on 18/10/2011 at 10:50
Please note that terms and conditions apply.
View the table of contents for this issue, or go to the journal homepage for more
Home Search Collections Journals About Contact us My IOPscience
IOP PUBLISHING ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LETTERS
Environ. Res. Lett. 4 (2009) 024002 (7pp) doi:10.1088/1748-9326/4/2/024002
Risk aversion, time preference, and the
social cost of carbon
David Anthoff1,2, Richard S J Tol1,3,4 and Gary W Yohe5
1 Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Republic of Ireland
2 International Max Planck Research School of Earth System Modelling, Hamburg, Germany
3 Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
4 Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
5 Department of Economics, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT, USA
Received 4 September 2008
Accepted for publication 30 March 2009
Published 17 April 2009
Online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/024002
Abstract
The Stern Review reported a social cost of carbon of over $300/tC, calling for ambitious
climate policy. We here conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis of this result on two crucial
parameters: the rate of pure time preference, and the rate of risk aversion. We show that the
social cost of carbon lies anywhere in between 0 and $120 000/tC. However, if we restrict these
two parameters to matching observed behaviour, an expected social cost of carbon of $60/tC
results. If we correct this estimate for income differences across the world, the social cost of
carbon rises to over $200/tC.
Keywords: economics of climate change, social cost of carbon, risk aversion, rate of pure time
preference
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1. Introduction
The social cost of carbon (the SCC) estimates the discounted
value of the damage associated with climate change impacts
that would be avoided by reducing carbon emissions by one
tonne. It is a useful measure for assessing the benefits of
climate policy at any point in time. It is generally thought to
increase over time, and textbook economics would recommend
that carbon emissions be taxed by a price set equal to the
SCC. The Stern Review [18–20] reported a SCC in excess of
$300/tC in the absence of any climate policy—an estimate
that lies well above the upper bound of $50/tC that was
found in an extensive literature survey and meta-analysis [26].
Many analysts have attributed this high estimate to the very
low rate of pure time preference adopted by the Stern author
team [1, 11, 13, 14, 30].
Others [5, 29] have argued that the Stern Review also
included unusual assumptions about risk aversion. We respond
to this observation by exploring the relative sensitivity of the
SCC to both the pure rate of time preference and the rate of risk
aversion. Our results support the hypothesis that the assumed
rate of risk aversion is at least as important as the assumed rate
of time preference in determining the social cost of carbon even
though our analysis reveals an enormous range of estimates.
Some are negative (that is, showing social benefits), but our
positive estimates span six orders of magnitude on the positive
side depending on both the pure rate of time preference and a
standard measure of risk aversion.
Philosophers would likely confront this range by choosing
a particular estimate based on what they deemed to be
appropriate reflections of both parameters [3, 4, 12, 15]. This
approach was adopted in the Stern Review, but here we take
a different tact. Instead of imposing our own normative
values on the selection of a single SCC estimate, we look
at the behaviours of democratically elected governments to
infer distributions of the rates of risk aversion and pure time
preference that are actually used in practice. We use the
resulting probability density to constrain the estimates of the
SCC and compute its expected value. Perhaps surprisingly, the
expected social cost of carbon turns out to be reasonably close
to the value reported in the Stern Review.
2. Time preference and risk aversion
To be sure, climate change is a long-term problem. This is why
the pure rate of time preference is so important. Greenhouse
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gas emission reduction over the near-term would mitigate
future damages, but they would do little to alter the present
climate and/or the present rate of change in climate impacts.
The costs of emission abatement must therefore be justified by
the benefits of avoided impacts in the future. It follows that any
statement about the desirability of climate policy necessarily
contains a value judgement about the importance of future
gains relative to present sacrifices. The discount rate employed
in benefit and cost calculations over time can be thought of
as the opportunity cost of investment, but it can also be seen
as the relative value of consumption over time. The two are
equivalent if the economy is in a dynamic equilibrium; and this
equivalence means that time preference is not alone in playing
a critical role in determining any SCC estimate.
To explain why, we note that people discount future
consumption for two reasons. Firstly, they expect to become
richer in the future, and so they care less about an additional
dollar then than they do about an additional dollar today.
Secondly, they are impatient. We also recall the so-called
Ramsey discount rate r that was designed to sustain optimal
saving over time [16]. It consists of three components:
r = ρ + ηg (1)
where ρ is the rate of pure time preference, g is the growth rate
of per capita consumption, and η is the elasticity of marginal
utility of consumption.
Both motives of personal discounting can be detected in
the Ramsey rule for dynamic optimality by considering the
rate at which people would be willing to sacrifice a dollar
of current consumption for additional consumption in the
future (see the SOM for brief details). The pure rate of
time preference is defined implicitly by the marginal rate of
substitution between present and future consumption under the
condition that consumption levels in both periods are equal (so
that g = 0). In words, the definition of the pure rate of time
preference calibrates inter-temporal trading so that individuals
who anticipate constant levels of consumption from one period
to the next would be willing to sacrifice one dollar of present
consumption if he or she would be compensated with $(1 + ρ)
of extra consumption in the next period. Higher values of ρ
therefore reflect higher degrees of impatience because higher
compensation would be required to compensate exactly for the
loss of $1 in current consumption.
Consumption levels need not be constant over time, and
the second term in equation (1) works the implication of this
fact into this trading calculus. While g measures the growth
rate of material consumption, ηg reflects the growth rate of
happiness measured in terms of underlying personal utility. If
consumption were to climb by g × 100% from one period to
the next, then each future dollar would be worth gη × 100%
less (assuming no impatience so ρ ≡ 0). It follows that
our individual would consider sacrificing one dollar in current
consumption only if he or she could be compensated by an
amount equal to $(1 + gη) in the future.
In contemplating welfare-based equivalence of consump-
tion over time, it is now clear that this trading-based accom-
modation of growing consumption works in exactly the same
way as the pure rate of time preference in defining the rate at
which the future needs to be discounted. Put another way, if
one considered empirical estimates for both ρ and η that range
from zero to three6, then both parameters should play equally
important roles in determining the appropriate discount rate.
Perhaps because ‘impatience’ is intuitively clear while the role
of the ‘elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consump-
tion’ is not, the debate over how the SCC could be so high has
focused undue attention over ρ almost to the exclusion of η.
This need not be the case; indeed, the utility-based
association with the Ramsey discounting rule shows that this
should not be the case. Climate change is not only a long-
term problem; it is also a very uncertain problem and a
problem that differentially affects people with widely different
incomes. The rate of pure time preference ρ speaks only
to the first characteristic of the climate policy problem—
the timescale issue. The elasticity of marginal utility with
respect to consumption, the parameter η, speaks to all three
characteristics. It is, first of all, a measure of the curvature
of the utility function, which maps material consumption
to happiness. It indicates precisely the degree to which
an additional dollar brings less joy as income increases.
Moreover, the parameter η can also be interpreted as a measure
of how one evaluates a gain of a dollar for rich person relative
to a gain of a dollar for a poor person. This is why η is
occasionally referred to as the parameter of inequity aversion.
In its simplest form, equity-weighted impacts are based on the
following equation
Dw =
∑
c
(
yw
yc
)η
Dc (2)
where Dw is the globally aggregate impact, Dc is the monetary
impact of climate change in country c, yw is globally average
per capita income, and yc is per capita income in country
c. If η = 0, the global impact is the unweighted sum of
national impacts but if η > 0, the impact of climate change on
poor countries (relative to the world average) receive a greater
weight than impacts on rich countries.
At the same time, curvature in the utility function can be
viewed as a reflection of risk aversion. In this role, η explains
why risk-averse people buy insurance; they are willing to pay a
premium that is proportional in first order approximation to the
parameter η to eliminate variability in outcomes because doing
so increases their expected utility7. Note that η also affects the
value one attaches to the impacts of climate change, but we
abstract from this in our discussion.
3. Estimating the social cost of carbon
Armed with these insights from the first principles of
microeconomic theory, we used the integrated assessment
6 Strictly, ρ ranges between 0 and 3 per cent per year, while η, as a ratio of
percentage changes, is unitless.
7 The risk premium is, by definition, the difference between the expected
outcome of a risky situation and the ‘certainty equivalent’ outcome—the
guaranteed outcome that would sustain a level of utility equal to expected
utility across the full range of possible outcomes. For a risk-averse individual,
the certainty equivalent is always less than the mean because losses relative to
the mean reduce utility more than equal gains above the mean.
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model FUND to test the hypothesis that η could actually turn
out to be more important in determining the SCC than ρ.
In many ways, FUND is a standard integrated assessment
model [9, 21, 22, 27]. It has simple representations of
the demography, economy, energy, emissions, and emission
reduction policies for 16 regions. It has simple representations
of the cycles of greenhouse gases, radiative forcing, climate,
and sea level rise. In other ways, though, FUND is unique.
It is alone in the detail of its representation of the impacts
of climate change. Impacts on agriculture, forestry, water
use, energy use, the coastal zone, hurricanes, ecosystems,
and health are all modelled separately—both in ‘physical’
units and their monetary value [23, 24]. Moreover, FUND
allows vulnerability to climate change impacts to be an explicit
function of the level and rate of regional development [25, 28].
See the SOM for more details on the model.
We estimated the SCC cost of carbon by computing the
total, monetized impact of climate change along a business
as usual path and along a path with slightly higher emissions
between 2005 and 2014.8 Differences in impacts were
calculated, discounted back to the current year, and normalized
by the difference in emissions9. The SCC is thereby expressed
in dollars per tonne of carbon at a point in time—the standard
measure of how much future damage would be avoided if
today’s emissions were reduced by one tonne. More details
on FUND are provided in the SOM10.
We estimated the SCC for a range of values for ρ and
η, but we report our results in stages to highlight the triple
role of η. We first consider results for cases in which η
affected only the discount rate. That is, we pretended that
uncertainty about climate change had been resolved and that
income differences between countries were irrelevant. The
second set of results put uncertainty back into the problem; the
reported expected values of the SCC are the product of a Monte
Carlo analysis of all the uncertain parameters in the FUND
model. A third batch of results were drawn from the original
world of perfect climate certainty, but social cost estimates
applied equity weighting to the regional impacts of climate
change. Finally, we report expected social cost estimates for
cases in which both uncertainty and equity weighing play
a role—the cases where η plays its theoretically appropriate
triple role11.
Based on first principles, we expected that the SCC would
react as follows to parameter changes. The higher the pure
rate of time preference, ρ, the less one cares about the future.
Damages from climate change, as they occur over time, are
therefore less of problem and the SCC should fall. Similarly,
the higher risk aversion, η, the higher the discount rate in a
scenario of growing per capita income and so the SCC should
8 The social cost of carbon of emissions in future or past periods is beyond
the scope of this paper.
9 We abstained from levelizing the incremental impacts within the period
2005–14 because the numerical effect of this correction is minimal while it
is hard to explain.
10 Full documentation of the FUND model, including the assumptions in the
Monte Carlo analysis, is available at http://www.fund-model.org.
11 Note that we assume that the scenarios of population, economy, energy and
emissions are independent of ρ and η. Implicitly, we thus assume that changes
in ρ and η are exactly offset by changes in the scenario of technological
change.
again fall. However, higher aversion to risk means that one is
more concerned about uncertainty and particularly concerned
about negative surprises; as a result, the SCC should rise with
higher values of η. Furthermore, the higher aversion to risk
also corresponds to greater concern about income distribution;
if one assumes that climate change disproportionally affects
the poor, then the SCC should again rise. Based on first
principles, therefore, we can predict the effect of changes
in time preference ρ, but the effect of risk aversion η is
ambiguous.
4. Results
Figure 1 shows the SCC cost of carbon for the four cases,
varying both ρ and η while figure 2 portrays various cross-
sections. If we ignore concerns about equity and uncertainty
(panel A), the SCC roughly decreases with the discount rate.
For ρ = η = 0, SCC = $1939/tC; it falls to SCC = $10/tC
for ρ = η = 1 and to SCC = −$5/tC for ρ = η = 2.
The sign changes because climate change is initially beneficial
to the world economy. For ρ = η = 3, however, SCC climbs
back to −$4/tC because the discount rate is so high that it even
discounts initial benefits significantly.
The profiles change when uncertainty is taken into
account. Panel B shows that a maximum is still observed where
ρ = η = 0 and the expected social cost of carbon, denoted
E(SCC) equals $2036/tC. This is a local maximum, though.
E(SCC) falls monotonically as ρ increases. E(SCC) also falls
initially as η (and thus the discount rate) increases, but it starts
rising as a greater η values puts more emphasis on the tail of the
distribution. For ρ = 0 and η = 3, E(SCC) = $152 155/tC.
E(SCC) is negative only for ρ  2.7% and 1.10  η  2.25.
Panel C shows that the results are different again with
equity weighing [2, 8] and no uncertainty. For ρ = η = 0,
SCC = $1, 939/tC; since η = 0 implies equal weights,
this is the global maximum. A local maximum appears at
SCC = $122/tC when ρ = 0 and η = 3. Since this
maximum is smaller than the expected social cost reported
above for the second set of values for ρ = 0, η = 3, we
see that uncertainty is a bigger concern for climate policy
than equity, at least in terms of an aggregate measure like the
SCC. A global minimum is observed when ρ = η = 3 and
SCC = −$50/tC. It emerges because CO2 fertilization brings
short-term benefits even to poor countries that will be hurt by
climate change in the longer term. For these parameters, long-
term losses are heavily discounted and short-term benefits in
developing countries are emphasized. See the supplementary
online material (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/024002) for
the case without CO2 fertilization.
Estimates of expected social cost are similar when equity
weighting is added to the complication of uncertainty. Panel
D has a local a maximum at ρ = η = 0 as before where
E(SCC) = $2036/tC, but the global maximum is E(SCC) =
$120 977/tC at ρ = 0, η = 3. E(SCC) is lowest for a high ρ
and a medium η; E(SCC) = $9/tC, for example, at ρ = 3.0%,
η = 0.90. Note that the E(SCC) is strictly positive for this, the
theoretically correct scenario.
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Figure 1. The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the rate of time preference and the rate of risk aversion. Panel A
(top left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates without equity weighting and without uncertainty; low pure rates of time preference and risk
aversion produce high SCC estimates because they work exclusively through the discount rate. Panel B (top right) shows the sensitivity of
SCC estimates to uncertainty without equity weighting; low rates of time preference produce higher estimates, but uncertainty dominates
especially for high levels of risk aversion where the associated risk-premium climbs enormously. Panel C (bottom left) shows the sensitivity
of SCC estimates to equity weighting derived from the ‘inequity aversion’ interpretation of η and without uncertainty; higher aversions to
inequity reduce the SCC for any time preference because the positive gains in developing countries from CO2 fertilization dominate
‘downstream’ losses that are, by virtue of the higher values for η, discounted more severely. Panel D (bottom right) shows the sensitivity of
SCC estimates to equity weighting with uncertainty fully represented; the moderating effect of higher values for η is dominated by the effect
of uncertainty.
For reference, Lord Stern of Brentford chose ρ = 0.1%,
η = 1; in our calibration through FUND, the result was
E(SCC) = $721/tC. Since the Stern Review essentially
ignored equity weighing, though, E(SCC) = $333/tC is
a more comparable statistic. The Stern Review estimate
E(SCC) = $314/tC, which is remarkable close. However,
note that the Review used the PAGE [10] model—which
truncates the tails of distributions of input parameters that
FUND fully recognizes12, but keeps vulnerability to climate
change as in 1995 while FUND has vulnerability declining
with development—the two main differences between the two
models roughly offset one another.
12 Note that we discard the top and bottom 1% of Monte Carlo results because
these outliers have an undue impact on the mean.
5. Choosing a social cost of carbon
We used two different approaches to inform our representations
of combinations ρ and η that reflect actual practice across
decision makers. In the first, we worked with results from
Evans and Sezer [6, 7], who estimated η = 1.49, with a
standard deviation of 0.19 for 22 rich and democratic countries
from income redistribution data [17]. They also independently
estimated ρ = 1.08±0.20%/year using data on mortality rates.
Assuming normality, these results support the probability
density function on ρ and η displayed in Panel A of figure 3.
The first row of table 1 records estimates of the expected
value of the SCC derived from this distribution for the four
cases described above (see supplementary online material for
4
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Figure 2. The SCC as a function of the rate of time preference (green diamonds for a rate of risk aversion of 1.0), the rate of risk aversion (red
squares for a rate of time preference of 2.0), and of the rate to time preference (blue triangles for a rate of risk aversion adjusted to maintain
the discount rate at 5.0 assuming that consumption grows at 2.0% per year—right axis). Panel A (top left) shows contours without equity
weighting and without uncertainty. Negative values for SCC are possible for high rates of risk aversion and/or time preference (and
guaranteed for a 5% discount rate); this is an indication of the conservative damage estimates embodied in FUND. Panel B (top right) displays
contours with η working as a risk aversion parameter given complete manifestation of uncertainty but ignoring its role as equity weighting
parameter at any point in time; the U-shaped contour associated with risk aversion is particularly instructive—the discounting effect of high
values is dominated by the risk-premium effect of increased aversion to risk. Panel C (bottom left) shows contours with η working to produce
equity weights without uncertainty; the early agricultural benefits of CO2 fertilization in developing countries produces negative estimates for
SCC for high discount rates born of high rates of risk aversion and/or time preference. Panel D (bottom right) allows η to work both as a
source of equity weighting and as a measure of risk aversion given climate and socio-economic uncertainty; the U-shaped contours of the
uncertainty only case from Panel B return.
details (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/024002)). Ignoring
concerns about equity and uncertainty, E(SCC) = −$1/tC.
Considering either equity or uncertainty alone increases the
estimate to $13/tC or $62/tC, respectively. Uncertainty is
again seen to play a larger role in determining the social cost
of carbon than equity. Considering both equity and uncertainty
produces the fourth estimate: E(SCC) = $210/tC. Equity and
uncertainty reinforce one another.
Our second approach relied data on per capita consumption
growth rates, inflation rates, and nominal interest rates for
27 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006. We interpreted
observations of the real interest rate (r in equation (1) and the
difference between the nominal rate and the rate of inflation)
and the growth rate g as drawings from a bi-variate normal
distribution. The Ramsey equation implies that realizations
for r and g together support a linear combination for ρ and
η. As a result, the bi-variate distribution for r and g implies
a degenerate bi-variate distribution for ρ and η. Panel B of
figure 3 displays this distribution. The mean for η is 1.18,
with a standard deviation of 0.80, but the distribution is right
skewed with a mode of η = 0.55. The mean of ρ is 1.4%,
with a standard deviation of 0.9%; the distribution is again
right skewed, this time with a mode of ρ = 0.9%. The
characteristics of this distribution are not inconsistent with the
underlying distributions reported by Evans and Sezer, but it
does clearly differ in shape. The second row of table 1 shows
5
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Figure 3. Probability density functions of risk aversion and time preference. Panel A displays the distribution reported by Evans and Sezer.
Panel B was derived from the Ramsey rule using OECD data.
Table 1. Estimates of the expected social cost of carbon ($/tC).
Uncertainty included? No No Yes Yes
Equity weighting included? No Yes Yes No
Rate of pure time preference
and rate of risk aversion from
Evans and Sezer
−0.7 12.6 210.1 61.6
Inference from interest rate
and consumption growth rates
from OECD countries
40.6 58.7 227.8 117.4
Both −0.4 13.2 205.5 60.7
the sensitivity of E(SCC) estimates to the difference. Ignoring
uncertainty and equity, E(SCC) = $41/tC; it is much higher
than the estimate reported in the first row from the Evans
and Sezer distribution because lower values of ρ and η are
deemed more likely. As before, considering either equity or
uncertainty increases the E(SCC), this time to $59/tC and
$117/tC, respectively. The effects of equity and uncertainty
are now less pronounced because extreme values of ρ and
η receive lower probability mass than before. Finally, as
before, uncertainty dominates equity. However, in this case,
equity moderates uncertainty; considering both simultaneously
produces an estimate for E(SCC) of $228/tC. Again, equity
and uncertainty reinforce one another.
The third row of table 1 shows E(SCC) estimates for a
combined probability density function of ρ and η produced by
multiplying the two PDFs in figure 3 and rescaling them to
integrate to unity. The estimates lie in between the previous
results, but closer to the initial results derived from the Evans
and Sezer PDF. The qualitative pattern is the same, though.
Uncertainty dominates, and is reinforced by equity. Combining
all of this information, our final estimate is E(SCC) =
$206/tC.
6. Conclusion
Lord Stern [18] has expressed a preference for debating
philosophically about the appropriate discount rate for the
benefits of mitigation. We bow out of that debate by
exploring the ramifications of actual decision makers and
actual developed economies. We find that aversion to risk
aversion is as important in determining SCC estimates as
time preference. More specifically, we offer high estimates
for the SCC given operational combinations of risk aversion
and time preference even with a model that incorporates
relative conservative damage estimates (including benefits
early) and autonomous adaptation drive by regional economic
development.
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